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NOTE 
McKENZIE v. DAY: IS TWENTY YEARS ON 
DEATH ROW CRUEL AND UNUSUAL 
PUNISHMENT? 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In McKenzie v. Day,l Duncan Peder McKenzie filed a writ 
of habeas corpus, claiming that extended incarceration on 
death row is so cruel and unusual that it invokes Eighth 
Amendment protections.2 The Ninth Circuit held that 
McKenzie was not entitled to a stay of execution pending the 
resolution of his claim.3 The Ninth Circuit relied on his failure 
to raise this claim earlier.4 Further, after only preliminary 
consideration, the Ninth Circuit concluded that McKenzie's 
claim would not likely succeed if it was litigated further.5 
In 1976, the United States Supreme Court decided that 
capital punishment does not violate the Eighth Amendment's 
protection against cruel and unusual punishment.6 This note 
raises the question whether extended incarceration on death 
row invokes the protections of the Eighth Amendment. This 
note examines four aspects of this issue. First, it traces the 
facts and procedural history of McKenzie. Second, the history of 
1. 57 F.3d 1461 (9th Cir. 1995) (Opinion by Kozinski, J., joined by Beezer, J., 
dissent by Norris, J.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1840 (1995). 
2. [d. at 1463. 
3. [d. at 1462. 
4. [d. at 1464-66. 
5. McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1462. 
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cruel and unusual punishment jurisprudence is discussed. 
Third, it details and analyzes the majority and dissenting 
opinions. Finally, it demonstrates that McKenzie is a poorly 
reasoned opinion. 
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In January of 1975, a jury convicted McKenzie of deliber-
ate homicide and aggravated kidnapping.7 On March 3, 1975, 
the district court of Montana sentenced McKenzie to death.8 
During his incarceration on death row for over two de-
cades, McKenzie filed three petitions for habeas relief.9 In his 
third petition, McKenzie claimed that an inordinate delay in 
carrying out his death sentence violated the Eighth 
Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punish-
ment.1O McKenzie attributed the delay to actions and errors 
committed by the State of Montana. 11 He specifically focused 
on two actions taken by the trial judge that raised questions 
about whether Montana convicted and sentenced McKenzie in 
7. State v. McKenzie, 557 P.2d 1023 (Mont. 1976), vacated sub nom. 
McKenzie v. Montana, 433 U.S. 903 (1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1050 (1980), 
reh'g granted sub nom. McKenzie v. Risley, 815 F.2d 1323 (9th. Cir. 1987), cert. 
denied sub nom. McKenzie v. McCormick, 488 U.S. 901 (1988), cert. denied sub 
nom. McKenzie v. Day, 115 S. Ct. 916 (1995), reh'g denied, 115 S. Ct. (1995), 
appeal dismissed, 894 P.2d 289 (Mont. 1995), stay denied, 57 F.3d 1461, (9th. Cir. 
1995). A person commits the offense of deliberate homicide if the person purposely 
causes the death of another human being or the person attempts to commit, com-
mits, or is legally accountable for the commission of a forcible felony and in the 
course of the forcible felony the person causes the death of another human being. 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-102 (1995). A person is guilty of aggravated kidnapping 
if he knowingly or purposely and without lawful authority restrains another person 
by either secreting or holding him in a place of isolation or by using or threaten-
ing to use physical force, with the purpose of inflicting bodily iI\iury. MONT. CODE 
ANN. § 45-5-303 (1995). 
8. McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1489. The sentencing judge stated that a primary 
motive in handing down the death penalty was that Montana law did not provide 
for life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Therefore, he feared that if 
McKenzie was not sentenced to death, McKenzie would serve only seven or eight 
years. [d. at 1471. 
9. [d. at 1463. 
10. [d. 
11. [d. at 1471. 
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violation of the U.S. Constitution.12 First, the judge gave jury 
instructions that shifted to McKenzie the burden of proving he 
lacked the requisite intent to commit the crime charged. 13 
Second, the judge and the prosecutor conferred alone just prior 
to McKenzie's capital punishment sentence.14 
B. JURY INSTRUCTIONS - FIRST PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS 
CORPUS 
McKenzie appealed his conviction to the Montana Su-
preme Court, claiming that the jury instructions given at trial 
violated the United States Constitution. IS He argued that the 
jury instructions relieved the state of proving all the elements 
of the crime alleged, and unlawfully shifted to McKenzie the 
burden of proving he lacked the requisite intent. 16 The Mon-
tana Supreme Court rejected McKenzie's arguments and af-
firmed his conviction. 17 
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and 
subsequently remanded the case to the Montana Supreme 
Court for consideration of the jury instructions. IS A year later, 
the Montana Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of 
the jury instructions and affirmed McKenzie's conviction.19 
The following year, the United States Supreme Court again 
granted certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded the 
case to the Montana Supreme Court to reconsider the consti-
tutionality of the jury instructions.20 The Montana Supreme 
12. McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1471. 
13. ld. 
14. ld. at 1471 (citing McKenzie v. McConnick, 27 F.3d 1415, 1417 (9th Cir. 
1994». 
15. See id. at 1490 (citing State v. McKenzie, 557 P.2d 1023, 1029 (Mont. 
1976». 
16. ld. at 1490. The instructions informed the jury that, if they found the 
defendant committed the illegal act on the victim, "the law directs you to reason 
from such unlawful act that the defendant acted with an unlawful intent." 
McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1490 n.1 (quoting McKenzie v. Montana, 449 U.S. 1050, 
1051-52 n.1 (1980». At trial, the prosecutor also requested that the jury receive 
alternative instructions. ld. 
17. ld. at 1490. 
18. McKenzie v. Montana, 433 U.S. 905 (1977); see supra note 7. 
19. McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1490 (citing McKenzie, 581 P.2d at 1205). 
20. ld. (citing McKenzie v. Montana, 443 U.S. at 903). In its decision, the U.S. 
Supreme Court referred to Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979), in which 
3
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Court held that the jury instructions were unconstitutional. 21 
However, the Court again affirmed McKenzie's conviction, 
finding that any violation of McKenzie's Fourteenth Amend-
ment rights constituted harmless error.22 In 1980, the United 
States Supreme Court denied McKenzie's third petition for 
certiorari.23 
In 1981, due primarily to Montana's admission that the 
jury instructions violated the Fourteenth Amendment, 
McKenzie filed a petition in federal court for writ of habeas 
corpus.24 Almost four years later, the district court dismissed 
the petition in an unpublished opinion.25 One year later, the 
Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to dismiss 
the petition.26 
C. Ex PARTE MEETING - SECOND PETITION FOR WRIT OF 
HABEAS CORPUS 
In 1985, while the first habeas petition was still pending, 
McKenzie's attorney discovered that the prosecutor and the 
sentencing judge had conferred alone for over forty-five min-
utes just prior to the judge handing down McKenzie's capital 
punishment sentence.27 Based on this new information, 
the Court held unconstitutional the very same jury instructions in question. [d. 
The Court reasoned that the instructions violated the Fourteenth Amendment 
requirement that the State prove every element of a crime beyond a reasonable 
doubt. [d. (citing Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 524). 
21. [d. at 1491 (citing State v. McKenzie, 608 P.2d 428, 457-59 (Mont. 1980». 
The Montana Supreme Court found the instructions unconstitutional because they 
shifted the burden of proof regarding intent to McKenzie. McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 
1491 (citing McKenzie, 608 P.2d at 458-59). 
22. [d. at 1491 (citing McKenzie, 608 P.2d at 457-59). The Montana Supreme 
Court held that this error was harmless because "the evidence on the issue of 
intent [was] overwhelming, uncontradicted, and permitted but one rational conclu-
sion." [d. (quoting McKenzie, 608 P.2d at 458-59). 
23. McKenzie v. Montana, 449 U.S. at 1050 (1980) (citations omitted). 
24. See McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1491. 
25. [d. 
26. [d. (citing McKenzie v. Risley, 801 F.2d 1519, 1520 (9th Cir. 1986». Fol-
lowing this decision, a number of judges voted to hear the case en bane. By a 
seven to four vote, this en bane court affirmed the decision, stating that the giving 
of the unconstitutional jury instructions constituted harmless error. [d. (citing 
Risley, 801 F.2d at 1530-32). 
27. McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1461, 1491-92 (9th Cir. 1995). The prosecutor 
claimed that he and the judge did not discuss McKenzie's possible sentencing. 
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McKenzie filed a second petition for writ of habeas corpus with 
the Montana Supreme Court, arguing that this ex parte meet-
ing violated his due process rights.28 On March 3, 1987, the 
United States District Court for the District of Montana dis-
missed McKenzie's second petition in an unpublished opin-
ion.29 
McKenzie appealed the district court's dismissal to the 
Ninth Circuit which remanded the petition to the federal dis-
trict court for an evidentiary hearing.3o In 1992, the district 
court denied the petition in another unpublished order.31 On 
June 24, 1994, a three-member panel of the Ninth Circuit af-
firmed the district court's dismissal by a 2-1 vote, holding that 
McKenzie had the burden of proving what took place at the ex 
parte meeting between the judge and prosecutor.32 
D. CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PuNISHMENT - THIRD PETITION FOR 
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 
On March 27, 1995, after the denial of McKenzie's second 
habeas petition, a Montana state district court scheduled 
McKenzie's execution for May 10, 1995.33 McKenzie appealed 
to the Montana Supreme Court, claiming for the first time that 
Montana's twenty-one year delay in carrying out his execution 
violated the Eighth Amendment.34 On April 11, 1995, the 
However, he admitted that they may have talked about the victim, the 
community's feeling about the case, and McKenzie's defenses. See McKenzie v. 
Risley, 915 F.2d 1396, 1397-98 (9th Cir. 1990). 
28. McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1492. McKenzie based his argument on a Supreme 
Court case, "which held that 'it is a denial of due process for a trial judge to 
impose the death penalty on the basis of information which was not disclosed and 
which the defendant had no opportunity to deny or explain.'" Id. (quoting Gardner 
v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977)). 
29. Id. 
30. Id. (citing McKenzie v. Risley, 915 F.2d 1396, 1398 (9th Cir. 1990)). The 
Ninth Circuit instructed the district court to decide whether the prosecutor and 
sentencing judge had discussed any matters that may have influenced the judge in 
his sentencing. However, before any evidentiary hearing took place, the prosecutor 
died and the record of his testimony regarding the ex parte meeting could not be 
found. See id. 
31. McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1492. 
32. Id. The majority admitted that the outcome of this appeal "turned on who 
would bear the burden of proving what happened at the ex parte meeting." Id. 
33. McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1461, 1492 (9th Cir. 1995). 
34. Id. at 1493. McKenzie based this claim on the Eighth Amendment's protec-
5
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Montana Supreme Court dismissed the appeal without ad-
dressing the merits of the Eighth Amendment claim.35 
On April 18, 1995, McKenzie filed his third petition for 
writ of habeas corpus in the federal district court of Montana, 
claiming that carrying out his execution at that late date 
would violate the Eighth Amendment.36 Two days later, the 
district court dismissed this third habeas petition as being 
"meritless as a successive and repetitive petition. "37 
On April 24, 1995, McKenzie appealed the federal district 
court's dismissal to the Ninth Circuit.3s One week later, he 
filed a motion with the Ninth Circuit to stay his execution.39 
The Ninth Circuit issued a certificate of probable cause and 
ordered expedited briefing and argument.40 
tion against cruel and unusual punishment. The Ninth Circuit referred to 
McKenzie's claim as a "Lackey claim" because a similar contention was raised by 
Clarence Allen Lackey in Lackey v. Texas. [d. (citing Lackey v. Texas, 115 S. Ct. 
1421 (1995». McKenzie also claimed on appeal that the sentencing violated the ex 
post {acto law because he was sentenced under a 1981 statute that "limited the 
judge's discretion in imposing a sentence other than death." [d. at 1492. 
35. [d. at 1492-93. 
36. See McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1493. In addition to claiming a violation of his 
rights under the Eighth Amendment, McKenzie raised seven other claims, includ-
ing: (1) changes made to Montana's capital punishment scheme since his conviction 
violated the ex post {acto clause; (2) changes in the method of execution violated 
the ex post {acto clause; (3) he was denied due process because he was not given 
an opportunity to consult with counsel before choosing his method of execution; (4) 
he was denied due process by the state's failure to consider new evidence in miti-
gation of his sentence; (5) he was denied due process by the state's refusal to re-
weigh the proportionality of his sentence in light of the reversal of convictions to 
which his crime had been compared; (6) his execution would violate the Eighth 
Amendment because he would be the first person executed in Montana since 1943 
and the only person executed under the pre-1977 death penalty statute; and (7) 
his death sentence was based on inaccurate facts because changes in the law 
would now allow him to be sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility 
of parole. [d. at 1463-64. 
37. [d. The court failed to discuss the merits of McKenzie's Eighth Amendment 
claim. [d. at 1473. 
38. [d. at 1473. 
39. McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1472. 
40. [d. at 1464. 
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III. BACKGROUND 
A. INTERPRETING THE PuNISHMENT CLAUSE 
Ratified in 1791, the Eighth Amendment states, 
"[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines im-
posed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.,,41 Prior 
to 1958, only a handful of cases addressed whether a punish-
ment would be considered cruel and unusua1.42 The Supreme 
Court first interpreted the "cruel and unusual" language of the 
punishment clause43 in Wilkerson v. Utah. 44 The Court re-
fused to "define with exactness the extent of the constitutional 
provision," but found it safe to affirm that the amendment 
forbids unnecessary cruelty and torture.45 
Eleven years later, the Court affirmed Wilkerson. 46 The 
Court held that punishments involving burning at the stake, 
crucifIXion, or breaking on the wheel violated the Eighth 
Amendment.47 However, the Court upheld death by electrocu-
tion as permissible, stating, "punishments are cruel when they 
involve torture or lingering death[,] . . . something inhumane 
and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment 
of life.,,48 
41. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
42. See e.g., In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160 (1890); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 
(1890), overruled by Trimble v. State, 478 A.2d 1143 (Md. 1984); McElvaine v. 
Brush, 142 U.S. 155 (1891); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910). 
43. The language, "nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted" is commonly 
referred to as the punishment clause. See generally Jonathan A. VoId, Note: The 
Eighth Amendment "Punishment" Clause After Helling v. McKinney: Four Terms, 
Two Standards, and a Search For Definition, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 215 (1994). 
44. 99 U.S. 130 (1878), overruled by Trimble v. State, 478 A.2d 1143 (Md. 
1984). The issue in Wilkerson was whether the sentence of public execution by 
shooting violated the· Eighth Amendment. See id. at 132-33. 
45. Id. at 135-36. The Court listed several forms of prohibited punishments 
which involved different types of torture. The Court held that being dragged to a 
hanging site, beheading, and public dissecting violated the punishment clause, 
while death by shooting did not. See id. at 135-37. 
46. See In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890) (Petitioner claimed that death by 
electrocution violated the Eighth Amendment.). 
47. Id. at 446. 
48. Id. at 447. The Court noted that execution generally is not cruel within 
the meaning of the words of the Constitution. Id. 
7
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In 1910, in Weems v. United States,49 the Supreme Court 
again refused to define with exactness the punishment clause, 
but stated that the clause "is not fastened to the obsolete but 
may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by 
a humane justice."so Attempting to further define the clause, 
the Court listed a number of factors courts should consider 
when resolving an Eighth Amendment claim.s1 The Court fo-
cused on the nature of the crime, the purpose of the law, the 
length of the sentence, and the proportion of the penalty as 
applied in similar cases, considering the crime and the defen-
dant.s2 Additionally, the Court noted that "there could be ex-
ercises of cruelty by laws other than those which inflicted bodi-
ly pain or mutilation."s3 
In 1958, the Supreme Court emphasized the inherent 
flexibility in the words "cruel and unusual."S4 The Court ex-
plained that the Amendment must draw its meaning from the 
"evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a 
maturing society."s5 Chief Justice Warren stated that the fun-
damental doctrine of the Eighth Amendment "is nothing less 
than the dignity of man."56 
While the objective "evolving standards of decency" retains 
its vitality as a principle governing Eighth Amendment analy-
sis, the Court has continued to further define the Eighth 
Amendment.57 In Gregg v. Georgia,58 the Court stated that 
49. 217 U.S. 349 (1910). Weems' sentence consisted of fIfteen years of hard 
labor in ankle chains, perpetual surveillance, and loss of his civil rights. The 
Court found that this punishment violated the "cruel and unusual punishment" 
clause. See id. at 351. 
50. [d. at 378. 
51. See generally, Weems, 217 U.S. at 380-82. 
52. [d. 
53. [d. at 372. 
54. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958). In Trop, the Court re-
viewed revoking the citizenship of a native-born American who had escaped from 
an Army stockade and deserted for a day. The Court concluded that loss of citi-
zenship violated the Eighth Amendment. [d. at 86-87. 
55. [d. at 101. 
56. [d. at 100. 
57. See Richard E. Shugrue, "A Fate Worse Than Death" - An Essay on Wheth-
er Long Times On Death Row Are Cruel Times, 29 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1, 12 
(1995). 
58. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 168-69 (1976). The Court decided that al-
lowing states to impose capital punishment for murder convictions did not violate 
8
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although an analysis of contemporary values concerning a 
challenged sanction is relevant to the application of the Eighth 
Amendment, it is not conclusive.59 The Supreme Court decid-
ed that courts must also "look to objective indicia that reflect 
the public attitude toward a given sanction" by considering 
whether the punishment is subjectively excessive.60 For a 
punishment to be excessive it must either involve unnecessary 
and wanton infliction of pain or be grossly out of proportion to 
the severity of the crime.61 
Recent Supreme Court decisions use both subjective and 
objective standards to review allegations of Eighth Amendment 
violations.62 The Eighth Amendment prohibits not only eigh-
teenth century concepts of cruelty, but also those practices 
deemed cruel and unusual by contemporary standards.63 
B. INORDINATE DELAYS IN CARRYING OUT EXECUTIONS 
The Supreme Court ruled that capital punishment, itself, 
does not violate the prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishment.54 The Court has also stated that the penalty of 
death differs from all other forms of criminal punishment.65 
Lengthy incarceration on death row is a punishment apart 
from the death penalty itself. 
Many prisoners on death row currently argue that extend-
ed incarceration on death row violates the Eighth 
Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punish-
the Eighth Amendment per se. Id. at 176-78. 
59. Id. at 173. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. The Court also noted that the judiciary still owed a certain amount of 
deference to legislators who assigned the punishments for crimes. See Gregg, 428 
U.S. at 174-76. 
62. See, e.g., Helling v. McKinney, 113 S. Ct. 2475, 2482 (1993). The Court 
held that the Eighth Amendment applies to conditions of confinement but viola-
tions require proof of a subjective component and this component does not vitiate 
the objective component in Eighth Amendment analysis. See also Furman v. Geor· 
gia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), reh'g denied, 409 U.S. 902 (1972) (listing four different 
theories under which a punishment may be considered cruel and unusual). 
63. Shugrue, supra note 57, at 12-13. 
64. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 154 (1976). 
65. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 995 (1990). 
9
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ment.66 This claim is not novel; various forms of this issue 
have previously been considered by the courtS.67 
In 1960, the Ninth Circuit considered Caryl Chessman's 
claim that he should not be executed because he has been on 
death row for eleven and one-half years, thus he has been 
subjected to cruel and unusual punishment.68 Chief Judge 
Richard H. Chambers, rejecting Chessman's claim, stated, "I do 
not see how we can offer life as a prize for one who can stall 
the processes for a given number of years, especially when in 
the end it appears the prisoner never really had any good 
points."69 
In 1984, the u.s. District Court for the District of Utah 
rejected a similar Eighth Amendment claim.70 The petitioner 
raised a cruel and unusual punishment claim based on the 
repeated setting and staying of execution dates.71 In rejecting 
this claim, the court held that to accept petitioner's argument 
would create an irreconcilable conflict between constitutional 
guarantees and would create a mockery out of the justice sys-
tem.72 
In 1986, the Ninth Circuit considered a comparable Eighth 
Amendment claim.73 The claimant argued that fulfilling his 
sentence after sixteen years on death row would constitute 
66. See, e.g., Fearance v. Scott, 56 F.3d 633 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 115 
S. Ct. 2603 (1995) (claimed cruel and unusual punishment by executing him after 
forcing him to endure over a decade on death row). See also Stafford v. Oklahoma, 
899 P.2d 657 (Okla. Crim. 1995), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2640 (1995) (claim that 
prolonged incarceration on death row constitutes cruel and unusual punishment). 
67. See Stafford, 899 P.2d at 657, and McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1461, 1463 
(9th Cir. 1995) (referring to this claim as a Lackey claim). See also infra notes 68-
85 and accompanying text. 
68. Chessman v. Dickson, 275 F.2d 604, 607 (9th Cir. 1960). 
69. [d. 
70. Andrews v. Shulsen, 600 F. Supp. 408, 431 (D. Utah 1984), affd, 802 F.2d 
1256 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 919 (1988). 
71. [d. 
72. [d. at 431. 
73. Richmond v. Lewis, 948 F.2d 1473 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 
506 U.S. 40 (1992). Although this case was reversed on other grounds in 1992, the 
law of the circuit was that no Eighth Amendment claim existed. See McKemie v. 
Day, 57 F.3d 1461, 1465 (9th Cir. 1995). 
10
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cruel and unusual punishment.74 The Ninth Circuit rejected 
the claim, stating "[a] defendant must not be penalized for 
pursuing his constitutional rights, but he also should not be 
able to benefit from the ultimately unsuccessful pursuit of 
those rights.,,75 
In evaluating Eighth Amendment violations, the Supreme 
Court also has considered objective evidence of international 
community values.76 Since 1986, foreign courts have devel-
oped a line of precedent which could support a conclusion dif-
ferent from that reached by United States courts; a conclusion 
that evolving standards of decency call for a closer examination 
of this issue.77 In 1989, the European Commission on Human 
Rights concluded "lengthy delays in executing death sentences 
in the United States make the death penalty inhuman or de-
grading treatment .... "78 Other foreign courts have consid-
ered whether lengthy delays in executing a prisoner consti-
tutes cruel and unusual punishment.79 In 1993, a British 
court held that to execute two inmates who had spent fourteen 
years on death row and who had been read execution warrants 
three times would constitute torture or inhumane or degrading 
punishment.80 The Supreme Court of Zimbabwe prohibited 
the execution of two inmates who had been on death row for 
74. Richmond, 948 F.2d at 1491. 
75. [d. at 1491-92. 
76. See, e.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830-31 & nn. 31, 34 (1988) 
(relying on Western European and Anglo-American opinion and practices to hold 
that assessing death penalty against juveniles constitutes cruel and unusual pun-
ishment). 
77. See generally McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1487 and Justice Norris' dissent dis-
cussing Soering v. United Kingdom, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 489 (1989), Pratt & Morgan 
v. Attorney General for Jamaica, 3 SLR 995 (Privy Council 1993), and Catholic 
Comm'n for Justice & Peace in Zimbabwe v. Attorney General, No. SC 73, report-
ed in 14 HUM. RTS. L.J. (1993). Our humanity gives rise to "an instinctive revul-
sion against the prospect of hanging a man after he has been held under sentence 
of death for many years." [d. (quoting Pratt & Morgan, 3 SLR at 16). 
78. Brief for Appellant at 24 (quoting Soering, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 489) (for-
bidding the extradition of persons charged with capital crimes from Europe to the 
United States). McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1488. 
79. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
80. McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1488 (quoting Pratt & Morgan, 3 SLR at 995). "This 
decision did not involve an interpretation of the cruel and unusual punishment 
clause of the English Bill of Rights of 1689 - the source of the Eighth Amend-
ment .... " but the Privy Council did survey English common law and conclude 
that these "practices were condoned historically at common law." [d. 
11
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four to six years, claiming that prolonged death row incarcera-
tion constituted inhuman or degrading punishment.sl 
In 1995, the United States Supreme Court, in Lackey v. 
Texas, addressed whether an inordinate delay in carrying out 
an execution violated the Eighth Amendment.s2 Lackey ques-
tioned whether executing a prisoner who had already spent 
seventeen years on death row violated the Eighth 
Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punish-
ment.S3 Although the Supreme Court denied certiorari, Jus-
tice Stevens issued a memorandum stating the Court would 
postpone its consideration until other courts had addressed the 
issue.s4 Justice Stevens' memorandum stated: 
[T]he death penalty serves 'two principal social 
purposes: retribution and deterrence'.85 It is 
arguable that neither ground retains any force 
for prisoners who have spent some seventeen 
years under a sentence of death. [W]hen the 
death penalty 'ceases realistically to further 
these purposes, its imposition would then be the 
pointless and needless extinction of life with 
only marginal contributions to any discernible 
social or public purposes. A penalty with such 
negligible returns to the State would be patently 
excessive and cruel and unusual punishment 
violative of the Eighth Amendment.'86 
The Court remanded Lackey to the district court for further 
consideration of the Eighth Amendment claim.s7 
81. [d. at 1488 (quoting Catholic Comm'n for Justice & Peace in Zimbabwe v. 
Attorney General, No. SC. 73, reported in 14 HUM. RTS. L.J. 323 (1993». In reach-
ing this decision, the court considered the "physical conditions" and the "mental 
anguish" endured by prisoners on death row. [d. 
82. Lackey v. Texas, 115 S. Ct. 1421, 1421-23 (1995). 
83. [d. 
84. [d. at 1422. 
85. [d. at 1421 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976)). 
86. [d. at 1421-22 (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 312 (1972». 
87. Lackey, 115 S. Ct. at 1421. The district court stayed the execution on the 
basis that reasonable jurists would disagree on the application of the abuse-of-the-
writ doctrine and the merits of Lackey's claim. However, the Fifth Circuit vacated 
the stay holding that the non-retroactivity doctrine barred his claim. Lackey v. 
Texas, 52 F.3d 98, 99 (5th Cir. 1995). Reversing the Fifth Circuit, the Supreme 
Court again granted a stay of execution. Lackey v. Texas, 115 S. Ct. 1818 (1995). 
12
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C. CONDITIONS ON DEATH Row 
Habeas petitions assert that to execute a petitioner after 
he or she has spent years on death row under torturous condi-
tions would violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition 
against cruel and unusual punishment.88 Petitioners argue 
that death row conditions invoke the protection of the Eighth 
Amendment because they violate evolving standards of decen-
cy.89 
One study of death row inmates documented the condi-
tions on death rows and the effects of these conditions on 
death row inmates.9o This study revealed that the majority of 
death row inmates are unable to work at prison jobs, attend 
education classes or religious services, participate in clubs, and 
have much less opportunity for exercise and recreation.91 
Moreover, most have little human contact and are confined to 
their cells over 22 hours a day.92 They eat in their cells and 
are separated from visitors by barriers.93 An inmate described 
his experience on death row.94 He described other inmates 
throwing feces from their cells; prisoners chained to their beds 
and lying in their own waste, and the availability of a single 
shower for 26 inmates which is "filthy, covered with human 
waste, frequently stopped up and shared by those with commu-
nicable diseases".95 Richard Strafer, an appellate law fellow, 
noted: "Apparently abandoned by the living, the condemned 
88. See, e.g., Lackey v. Texas, 115 S. Ct. 1421, 1421-22 (1995); Free v. Peters, 
50 F.3d 1362 (7th Cir. 1995); Williams v. Chrans, 50 F.3d 1363 (7th Cir. 1995). 
89. See, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). 
90. See G. Richard Strafer, Volunteering for Execution: Competency, 
Voluntariness and the Propriety of Third Party Intervention, 74 J. CRIM. L. & 





94. Laura LaFay, 15 Years on Death Row Willie Lloyd Turner Has Been on 
Death Row Longer Than Anyone Else In Modern-Day Virginia History. In An Ap-
peal Filed This Week, His Lawyer Says That Turner Has Been Punished Enough, 
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are subjected to massive deprivations of personal autonomy on 
death row."96 
For many years, courts and medical experts have acknowl-
edged the dehumanizing effect of death row conditions on pris-
oners.97 In 1972, the California Supreme Court, concluding 
that capital punishment violated the Eighth Amendment's 
punishment clause98, stated: 
The cruelty of capital punishment lies not only 
in the execution .... but also in the dehumaniz-
ing effects of the lengthy imprisonment prior to 
execution. . . . Penologists and medical experts 
agree that the process of carrying out a verdict 
of death is often so degrading and brutalizing to 
the human spirit as to constitute psychological 
torture .... 99 
The Supreme Court of Massachusetts elaborated on such no-
tions: "Punishment is cruel when it involves 'a lingering 
death'''.l°O Since death sentences will ... be carried out only 
after agonizing months and years of uncertainty, the punish-
ment is cruel and unusual.,,101 
Justice Frankfurter once recognized that prisoners who 
experience insanity while awaiting execution of a death sen-
tence are not rare. 102 In another case,103 Justice Brennan 
acknowledged "that mental pain is an inseparable part of our 
practice of punishing criminals by death, for the prospect of 
pending execution exacts a frightful toll during the inevitable 
long wait between the imposition of the sentence and the actu-
96. Strafer, supra note 90 at 74. 
97. See Johnson, Under Sentence of Death: The Psychology of Death Row Con· 
fineTTumt, 5 LAw & PSYCHOLOGY REVIEW 141, 157·161 (1979); Gallemore & Parton, 
Inmate Response to Lengthy Death Row Confinement, 129 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 167 
(1972). 
98. People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880 (Cal. 1972), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 958 
(1972). 
99. Anderson, 493 P.2d at 894-95. 
100. District Attorney for Suffolk Dist. v. Watson, 411 N.E. 2d 1274 (Mass. 
1980) (quoting In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890». 
101. Id. 
102. Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 14 (1950), reh'g denied, 339 U.S. 926 
(1950), overruled by Ford v. Strickland, 734 F.2d 538 (11th Cir. 1984). 
103. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
14
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 1 [1996], Art. 6
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol26/iss1/6
1996] DEATH ROW 55 
al infliction of death."I04 Psychiatrists and psychologists, legal 
commentators and authors, and prison wardens, have all 
shared in the opinion that prisoners on death row live in tor-
turous conditions. 105 
In sum, the Supreme Court has held that the Eighth 
Amendment's punishment clause "may acquire meaning as 
public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice.,,106 
Further, the Court stated that the Amendment must draw its 
meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the 
progress of a maturing society.107 Considering the results of 
death row studies, as well as court decisions, Justice Stevens 
and Justice Breyer agreed that whether an inordinate delay in 
carrying out an execution constitutes cruel and unusual pun-
ishment is an important question and is sufficient to warrant 
review by courts. 108 
IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION 
In McKenzie v. Day,I09 the majority addressed two sepa-
rate issues posed by McKenzie. 110 First, the Ninth Circuit 
analyzed McKenzie's appeal from the district court's dismissal 
of the petition for habeas corpus. III Second, it addressed 
104. Id. at 288-89 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
105. See, e.g., Strafer, supra note 90, at 74; Note, Mental Suffering Under the 
Sentence of Death: A Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 57 IOWA L. REV. 814, 826-31 
(1972); Schabas, Execution Delayed, Execution Denied, 5 CRIM. L. FORUM 180 
(1994); Mello, Facing Death Alone, 37 AMER. L. REV. 513, 552 (1989); Stafer, Sym-
posium on Death Penalty Issue: Volunteering For Execution, 74 J. CRIM. L. 860, 
861 (1983); Johnson, Under Sentence of Death: The Psychology of Death Row Con-
finement, 5 LAw & PSYCHOLOGY REVIEW 141, 157-61 (1979); Gallemore & Parton, 
Inmate Response to Lengthy Death Row Confinement, 129 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 167 
(1972); C. DUFFY & A HIRSHBERG, 88 MEN AND 2 WOMEN (1962). A former war-
den at San Quentin stated: "One night on death row is too long, and the length of 
time spent there constitutes cruelty that defies the imagination. It has always 
been a source of wonder to me that they didn't all go stark raving mad." Id. at 
254. 
106. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910). 
107. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). 
108. Lackey, 115 S. Ct. at 1421. 
109. McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1461 (9th Cir. 1995). 
110. Id. at 1464. 
111. Id. McKenzie sought a stay and a remand to the district court for consid-
15
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McKenzie's alternative request for the court to issue a writ of 
habeas corpus based on the merits of his Lackey claim. 112 
1. The Stay 
The Ninth Circuit restated the Supreme Court's holding 
that a "court may consider the last-minute nature of an appli-
cation to stay execution in deciding whether to grant equitable 
relief."113 The majority concluded that McKenzie, like the pe-
titioner in Gomez v. United States District Court for the 
Northern District of California,114 raised claims that should 
have been brought much earlier in the legal proceedings.115 
The majority reasoned that there was a strong presumption 
against granting a stay created by McKenzie's delay in raising 
his claim.116 According to the court, raising the claim six 
weeks prior to his execution was abusive. 117 
a. Timing the Stay Request 
The Ninth Circuit recognized that McKenzie's stay request 
rested on his claim that the 20 year delay in carrying out his 
execution constituted cruel and unusual punishment.11s The 
court noted that a 1960 Ninth Circuit case119 resolved a simi-
lar claim and another holding120 30 years later addressed 
McKenzie's argument exactly.121 Since the Ninth Circuit had 
already addressed this claim, McKenzie could have raised the 
eration of his Eighth Amendment claim. [d. 
112. [d. By ruling on the merits, the Ninth Circuit would bypass the equitable 
considerations. McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1470. 
113. [d. at 1464 (quoting Gomez v. United States Dist. Ct. for the N. Dist. of 
Cal., 503 U.S. 653 (1992». The Supreme Court in Gomez denied the request for 
stay of execution due to the "abusive delay" in bringing the claim. [d. (citing 
Gomez, 503 U.S. at 653-54). 
114. 503 U.S. 653 (1992). This was the famous case of Robert Alton Harris. 
McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1464. 
115. McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1464. 
116. [d. at 1467. 
117. [d. 
118. See id. at 1465. 
119. Chessman v. Dickson, 275 F.2d 604, 607 (9th Cir. 1960). 
120. Richmond v. Lewis, 948 F.2d 1473 (9th Cir. 1990). 
121. McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1465. 
16
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issue as early as his first or second federal habeas peti-
tions. 122 
The majority acknowledged that the Ninth Circuit had 
rejected precisely this claim in 1990/23 McKenzie would argu-
ably have been frivolous in raising it. l24 However, the court 
determined that McKenzie could have raised the claim prior to 
the Ninth Circuit's rejection in 1990, or after the court vacated 
its decision in 1993.125 The majority noted that had McKenzie 
raised the issue at either of these times, the court could have 
considered his claim without having to vacate a death war-
rant. 126 Further, the Ninth Circuit concluded that McKenzie 
offered no reasonable excuse for failing to raise this issue earli-
er except for his claim that his counsel believed it would be 
unsuccessful. 127 However, the majority pointed out that this 
fact did not stop a petitioner from raising it in 1984,128 or an-
other from asserting this claim in 1995.129 Therefore, the ma-
jority concluded that McKenzie should have raised his Eighth 
Amendment claim earlier.130 
122. See Uf. The majority points out that McKenzie could have moved to amend 
his first petition prior to it being resolved in the district court. Id. at 1464 n.6. 
123. Richmond, 948 F.2d at 1473. This decision was vacated in 1993. Richmond 
v. Lewis, 986 F.2d 1583 (9th Cir. 1993). 
124. McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1465. The court said "arguably" because "so long as 
the claim was not finally addressed by the Supreme Court, a death row inmate 
would have been well within his rights in raising the issue to preserve it for Su-
preme Court review." Id. at n.8. 
125. Id. The majority noted that in 1990 McKenzie had been on death row for 
fifteen years, almost the same amount of time that Lackey had been on death row 
when he first raised the same argument. Id. at 1465. 
126. Id. When a court vacates a death warrant, the existing death warrant 
becomes void. Then if the petitioner is unsuccessful in his habeas petition the 
court has to re-issue a new death warrant setting a new date and time. See gener-
ally, Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988). 
127. McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1465. Counsel for McKenzie explained that he re-
fused to raise "frivolous claims, not only because such conduct is sanctionable, but 
also because he considers respect for the court to be paramount." Id. at 1475. 
128. Id. at 1465. See Richmond, 948 F.2d at 1491-92. Richmond claimed that 
fulfillment of his sentence after so many years on death row would constitute 
cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 1480. 
129. See Lackey v. Texas, 115 S. Ct. 1421 (1995). See supra note 34 and ac-
companying text. 
130. McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1464. 
17
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b. Preliminary Consideration on the Merits 
Next, the Ninth Circuit gave McKenzie's claim preliminary 
consideration.13l The court reasoned that a strong showing of 
success on the merits might, on rare occasions, outweigh abu-
sive delay in raising the claim. 132 
The court began its consideration of the merits by refer-
ring to Richmond v. Lewis,133 in which the Ninth Circuit stat-
ed that a petitioner must not be penalized for asserting his 
constitutional rights, but he should not benefit from the ulti-
mately unsuccessful pursuit of those rights. 134 Applying this 
reasoning, the Ninth Circuit claimed that the delay has been 
caused by McKenzie availing himself of the procedures provid-
ed to ensure that executions are carried out only in appropri-
ate cases.135 The court concluded that delays due to proce-
dures created to prevent cruel and unusual punishment could 
not alone violate the Eighth Amendment. 136 
c. Policy Behind Not Sustaining the Eighth Amendment Claim 
The court recognized that sustaining McKenzie's Eighth 
Amendment claim would greatly affect procedures regarding 
capital punishment. 137 The court explained that stays are 
frequently granted because a state is not permanently deprived 
of carrying out the punishment.13s The majority held that 
sustaining McKenzie's unconstitutional delay claim would put 
states at the risk of not being able to enforce their sentenc-
131. [d. at 1466. 
132. [d. 
133. 948 F.2d 1473 (9th Cir. 1990). 
134. Richmond, 948 F.2d at 1491-92. 
135. McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1466-67. 
136. See id. at 1467. "[O]ne who is sentenced to death need not have excessive 
review, ... but the constitutional mandate of adequate review requires strict 
adherence. To provide less renders the death penalty cruel and unusual." [d. at 
n.12 (quoting Deutscher v. Whitley, 991 F.2d 605, 607 (9th Cir. 1993)). 
137. McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1467. 
138. [d. 
18
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es. 139 The Ninth Circuit feared that death row inmates could 
avoid their sentences by drawing out the appeals process and 
thereby prevent the state from carrying out its sentence. l40 
Following this reasoning, the court feared that the administra-
tion of death penalty cases under pressure to avoid delays 
would emphasize speed instead of accuracy.l4l 
Finally, the majority stated that even if the court decided 
that McKenzie's claim constituted cruel and unusual punish-
ment, commutation of the death penalty was an improper 
remedy.142 The court reasoned that McKenzie's years of suf-
fering could not be undone, nor would commutation of the 
death penalty relieve the pain of others in similar situa-
tions. l43 
In deciding whether to grant equitable relief, the majority, 
after weighing the State's strong interest in proceeding with its 
sentence and considering the last-minute nature of an applica-
tion to stay the execution, concluded that McKenzie's Eighth 
Amendment claim should have been raised earlier. l44 Fur-
ther, the majority concluded that it was highly unlikely that 
McKenzie's claim would be successful if litigated on its mer-
its. l45 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit denied McKenzie's request 




141. [d. The court noted that almost 1700 out of 5000 people have received 
some kind of relief from capital punishment, and implied that this figure would be 
severely affected if the court emphasized speed as compared to accuracy. McKenzie, 
57 F.3d at 1467 n.13 (quoting BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, Capital Punishment 
1993, at 12). 
142. [d. at 1467. 
143. [d. The Ninth Circuit noted that when other prisoners complain of prison 
conditions, they correct the conditions; they do not reduce their sentences. [d. 
144. Id. at 1468 (quoting Gomez, 503 U.S. at 653). 
145. McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1467. 
146. [d. at 1469. The majority further stated that the court was unable to 
grant McKenzie's request for a stay based on any of his other claims. Again, the 
majority expressed that the claims should have been raised at an earlier time or 
were completely without merit. [d. 
19
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2. Stay Motion Made Directly To the Court 
The Ninth Circuit also denied McKenzie's request to di-
rectly issue the writ based on the merits of his Eighth Amend-
ment claim. 147 The opinion reiterated that the merits of 
McKenzie's Eighth Amendment claim were highly question-
able. l48 The majority stated that delays due to procedures 
created to prevent cruel and unusual punishment could not 
violate the Eighth Amendment. 149 The court expressed fear 
that sustaining the Eighth Amendment claim would emphasize 
speed instead of accuracy in death penalty cases. 150 The court 
ultimately held that even if the delay did constitute cruel and 
unusual punishment, commutation of the death penalty was 
not the proper remedy. 151 Therefore, the court explained its 
reluctance to grant the equivalent of summary judgment. 152 
The court refused to further examine the merits of McKenzie's 
claim and declined to order the writ. 153 
B. THE DISSENT 
1. The District Court's Failure to Follow Proper Procedures 
In his dissent, Judge Norris addressed the majority's fail-
ure to properly address McKenzie's appeal of the district 
court's dismissal of the writ.1S4 He asserted that the district 
court erred in finding that McKenzie's claims were "succes-
sive. "155 The dissent explained that the district court should 
have applied abuse of writ doctrine procedures as mandated by 
147. McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1470. McKenzie claimed that the long delay in carry-
ing out his sentence, independent of any other claims, proved that he was sub-
jected to cruel and unusual punishment. [d. 
148. [d. 
149. [d. at 1467. 
150. [d. 
151. McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1467. See also supra note 143. 
152. [d. at 1470. 
153. [d. 
154. McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1461, 1470 (9th Cir. 1995). 
155. [d. (citing Campbell v. Blodgett, 997 F.2d 512, 515-16 (9th Cir. 1992)). 
Norris stated that a claim is considered "successive" only if it has been raised in 
a previous petition. [d. at 1472. Judge Norris pointed out that this was 
McKenzie's first time raising the Eighth Amendment violation claim. [d. at 1470. 
20
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the Supreme Court.156 Further, the dissent argued that the 
Ninth Circuit should have reversed the dismissal, remanded 
the case to the district court, and ordered the court to follow 
the proper procedures.157 Instead of following the proper pro-
cedures, the majority took no action on the appeal of the dis-
missal. 158 "Nonetheless, the majority has paradoxically decid-
ed that because McKenzie did not bring his claim earlier, his 
potentially meritorious petition will be mooted by his potential-
ly unconstitutional execution. »159 
2. The Majority's Misinterpretation of Gomez 
The dissent criticized the majority's gross misinterpreta-
tion and misapplication of the holding from Gomez. 160 Judge 
Norris argued that Gomez provided a rule of very narrow ap-
plication which extended the abuse of writ doctrine. 161 Judge 
Norris contended that the majority interpreted Gomez as turn-
ing on the single fact of inexcusable delay; however, he insisted 
that courts may properly refuse to grant a stay only to peti-
tioners who at the last-minute, attempt to manipulate the 
judicial process. 162 Judge Norris explained that the punitive 
156. [d. at 1472 (citing McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 470 (1991), reh'g de-
nied, 501 U.S. 1224 (1991»). The abuse of writ doctrine should be applied to a 
claim raised for the first time in a subsequent petition: 
When a prisoner files a second or subsequent application, 
the government bears the burden of pleading abuse of the 
writ .... To excuse his failure to raise the claim earlier, 
petitioner must show cause for failing to raise it. . . . If 
petitioner cannot show cause, the failure to raise the 
claim may nonetheless be excused if he can show that a 
fundamental miscarriage of justice would result from a 
failure to entertain the claim. 
McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 494-95. 
157. McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1470. Judge Norris reasoned "at that point the dis-
trict court would still have had time to call a scheduling conference to arrange an 
expedited hearing on the petition's motion for a stay, permitting the State to raise 
abuse of the writ and allowing the petitioner to demonstrate cause and prejudice 
or miscarriage of justice in a manner mandated by McCleskey." [d. at 1474. Norris 
also emphasized that counsel for Mr. McKenzie was first confronted by Gomez at 
oral argument and was required to respond without preparation nor briefing. [d. 
at 1471. 
158. [d. at 1474. 
159. [d. at 1475. 
160. See McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1474-80 (citing Gomez v. United States Dist. Ct. 
for the N. Dist. of Cal., 503 U.S. 653 (1992)). 
161. See id. at 1476-77. 
162. [d. at 1477. See Gomez, 503 U.S. at 653. Norris claimed that the "lan-
21
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holding of Gomez, refusal to consider a proper claim that may 
save a petitioner's life, has never been considered appropriate 
except when the petitioner has completely failed to present 
even a "semblance of a reasonable excuse for the inordinate 
delay."l63 
Judge Norris noted that two facts led the Gomez court to 
find that defendant's petition was a last minute effort to ma-
nipulate the judicial process. l64 First, the petitioner in Gomez 
sought a stay a mere three days before his scheduled execu-
tion. 165 Second, the petitioner in Gomez sought a stay of exe-
cution through a class action under § 1983, rather than 
through a habeas petition in a blatant attempt to avoid appli-
cation of the abuse of the writ doctrine. 166 
3. Petitioner Did Not Attempt to Manipulate the Judicial 
Process 
Judge Norris found that once the court properly applied 
the Gomez holding to rest on petitioners who try to manipulate 
the judicial process, it would find that the Gomez rule is inap-
plicable to McKenzie. 167 First, he argued that McKenzie's pe-
tition for a stay was not a last minute effort to stay his execu-
tion. 16s McKenzie brought this claim more than six and a half 
weeks prior to his scheduled execution, as compared to the 
Gomez petitioner who raised his claim only three days before 
he was scheduled to die. 169 Second, Montana neither accused 
guage of manipulation is not accidental, but rather points to the central facts 
upon which the case turned." McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1467. Norris also noted that 
no other circuit has read Gomez to apply as broadly as the majority suggested. 
See id. at 1478. 
163. ld. at 1476 (citing Herrera v. Collins, ll3 S. Ct. at 874 (O'Connor, J., 
concurring». In Herrera, the petitioner presented new evidence eight years after 
his conviction without offering any excuse for this delay. Herrera, ll3 S. Ct .. at 
874. 
164. McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1477. 
165. ld. 
166. ld. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is a civil rights action against a state actor for depri-
vation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution. 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). 
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McKenzie of attempting to manipulate the judicial process nor 
brought forward any proof to support this allegation.170 Argu-
ing that the majority should not have classified McKenzie's 
petition as a last-minute application, Judge Norris found that 
McKenzie had good cause for not raising his claim earlier, and 
therefore did not file his petition in an attempt to manipulate 
the judicial process. 171 
Judge Norris noted that through the early 1990s, every 
Ninth Circuit case involving a claim similar to McKenzie's had 
been flatly rejected by the Ninth Circuit.172 The dissent con-
ceded that other cases raised this claim, but noted that these 
other cases still lacked any positive precedent to rely upon. 173 
Norris insisted that McKenzie's failure to assert this previous-
ly rejected claim did not demonstrate that McKenzie was try-
ing to manipulate the judicial process. 174 
Judge Norris further explained that, until March of 1995, 
McKenzie had no basis to believe that his Eighth Amendment 
claim might be successful. 175 Judge Norris pointed out that 
McKenzie raised his Eighth Amendment claim following the 
Supreme Court's decision to grant a stay of execution in Lackey 
v. Texas. 176 Additionally, Judge Norris noted that McKenzie's 
first positive authority supporting his unconstitutional delay 
claim did not come until March 27, 1995, when Justice Stevens 
published a memorandum on the viability of this claim. 177 
170. [d. See supra note 163 and accompanying text. 
171. [d. at 1479. 
172. See, e.g., Richmond v. Lewis, 948 F.2d at 1491-92 (9th Cir. 1990); Chess-
man v. Dickson, 275 F.2d 604, 607 (9th Cir. 1960). 
173. McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1480. 
174. [d. at 1480-81. Norris insisted that McKenzie raising his Lackey claim for 
the frrst time six weeks before his execution, cannot by itself justify finding 
McKenzie guilty of engaging in a last minute attempt to manipulate the judicial 
process. [d. at 1480. In addition, "[t]he fact that the claim was not completely 
unheard of, and had been raised in three or four cases . . . at the state or district 
court level, is not sufficient to show that counsel engaged in manipulative behav-
ior .... " [d. at 1481. 
175. [d. at 1480-81. 
176. McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1480-81 (citing Lackey, 115 S. Ct. 1274 (1995». The 
Supreme Court issued the stay while deciding whether to grant certiorari on 
Lackey's Eighth Amendment violation claim. The dissent claimed that this indicat-
ed to McKenzie that this claim was "advancing." [d. at 1480. 
177. [d. at 1481 (citing Lackey, 115 S. Ct. at 1421). 
23
Bell: Death Row
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1996
64 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:41 
Judge Norris pointed out that this was the exact day McKenzie 
first asserted his unconstitutional delay claim. 178 
Finally, Judge Norris argued that, unlike the petitioner in 
Gomez, McKenzie's claim could possibly depict him as being 
innocent of the death penalty.179 McKenzie argued that the 
substantial delay and harsh conditions on death row have 
made him ineligible for execution pursuant to the Eighth 
Amendment. lso If he prevailed on this claim, McKenzie could 
have shown that he should not be executed. 181 
In conclusion, the dissent explained that the proper inter-
pretation of Gomez does not support the majority's holding that 
McKenzie's Eighth Amendment claim was a last minute at-
tempt to manipulate the judicial process.182 Gomez should not 
deny McKenzie the chance to have his petition properly consid-
ered on remand to the district court. 183 
4. The Stay 
The dissent next addressed the issue of whether the Ninth 
Circuit should have issued a stay pending consideration of the 
petition by the district court on remand. l84 The dissent re-
ferred to the proper standard for granting a stay set forth by 
the Supreme Court: a court should grant a stay only if the 
claim presents substantial grounds upon which relief might be 
granted. ls5 Further, the dissent noted that there is a strong 
equitable presumption for granting stays of execution to permit 
178. Id. 
179. Id. at 1478. 
180. McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1478. 
18l. Id. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), reh'g denied, 490 U.S. 1031 
(1989). "[TJhe term 'innocence of the death penalty' is equally appropriate to de-
scribe a defendant who has been declared ineligible for such punishment based on 
facts arising after trial." Id. at 1479. 
182. Id. at 1479-80. 
183. Id. at 1482. 
184. McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1482. 
185. Id. (citing Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983)). The dissent in Barefoot 
elaborated that "substantial grounds" includes claims that are "debatable among 
jurists of reason or are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further." 
Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 893. 
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full consideration of habeas petitions.186 The dissent argued 
that McKenzie's Eighth Amendment unconstitutional delay 
claim meets the standard expressed by the Supreme Court and 
a stay should have been granted pending the remanded deci-
sion.187 
5. The Eighth Amendment Claim 
The dissent noted that Justice Stevens addressed 
McKenzie's Eighth Amendment claim in his memorandum 
respecting the denial of certiorari in Lackey v. Texas. l88 Jus-
tice Stevens' memorandum stated that neither retribution nor 
deterrence serves any purpose for prisoners who have spent 
over 17 years on death row. 189 The dissent argued that exe-
cuting a prisoner after such a long delay would be pointless 
and that it would have "only marginal contributions to any 
discernible social or public purposes."190 The dissent summed 
up Justice Stevens' memorandum by stating a penalty with 
such insignificant returns to the State would be excessively 
cruel and unusual and would violative the Eighth Amend-
ment. l9l 
The dissent argued that McKenzie presented a strong case 
that his execution would not further the two principal social 
purposes - retribution and deterrence - that justify capital 
punishment.192 The dissent asserted that his delay, coupled 
with confinement under the harsh and punitive conditions on 
death row, satisfied the retribution interest.193 Further, the 
dissent insisted that the additional deterrent effect of execut-
ing McKenzie was nil due to the time that has passed since he 
was sentenced; because no one in Montana has been executed 
186. McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1476. 
187. Id. at 1482. The dissent also claims that McKenzie's ex post facto claim 
would also meet this standard. Id. at 1482. 
188. McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1484 (citing Lackey, 115 S. Ct. at 1421). 
189. Id. at 1484-85 (quoting In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 172 (1890». 
190. Id. (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 312 (1972». 
191. Id. at 1485 (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 312 (1972)). 
192. Id. at 1486. 
193. McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1486. 
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since 1943, and no one has been sentenced to death under 
McKenzie's sentencing statute. 19' 
The dissent further maintained that McKenzie's argument 
has gained additional strength from recent decisions in foreign 
COurtS.195 First, the dissent pointed to a recent decision by the 
Privy Council of the British House of Lords. 196 The Privy 
Council held that to execute a prisoner who had been on death 
row for fourteen years would constitute torture or inhuman or 
degrading punishment.197 The dissent also mentioned a case 
decided by the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe198 where the 
court prohibited the execution of a prisoner who had been sen-
tenced six years before, claiming that it was inhuman or de-
grading punishment. 199 
The dissent concluded its discussion of whether to grant a 
stay by arguing that McKenzie's unconstitutional delay claim 
is "substantial, important, and deserving of careful and 
thoughtful adjudication."20o ffitimately, the dissent urged 
that the only proper remedy in this case would be to vacate the 
district court's order, remand the case to the district court, and 
stay the execution.201 
194. Id. at 1486-87. 
195. Id. at 1487. The dissent recognized that the foreign decisions do not di-
rectly address the Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual punishment clause. 
However, the dissent noted that the Privy Council surveyed common law and 
"concluded that extended imprisonment on death row and the repeated setting of 
execution dates were not practices condoned historically at common law." Id. 
196. Id. (citing Pratt & Morgan v. Attorney Gen. for Jamaica, 3 SLR 995, 2 AC 
I, 4 All ER 769 (Privy Council 1993». 
197. McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1487. 
198. Id. at 1488 (citing Catholic Comm'n for Justice & Peace in Zimbabwe v. 
Attorney General, No. S.C. 73 (Zimb. June 24, 1993». 
199. Id. (citing Catholic Comm'n for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe, No. S.C. at 
4-5). In reaching its conclusion, the court also considered the physical conditions 
and mental anguish. Id. 
200. Id. (Norris, J., dissenting). 
201. McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1489. The dissent finally argued that to allow 
McKenzie to die while Lackey is allowed to argue the exact same claim would be 
the "antithesis of justice." Id. 
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V. CRITIQUE 
The Ninth Circuit misapplied Gomez202 to McKenzie's 
third petition for habeas corpus; as a result, the Ninth Circuit 
did not address McKenzie's appeal from the district court's 
dismissal of his petition.203 Further, the Ninth Circuit ig-
nored prior Supreme Courts holdings offering guidance for 
evaluating Eighth Amendment claims.204 
A. THE MISAPPLICATION OF GOMEZ 
The majority denied McKenzie's motion for a stay by find-
ing Gomez applicable to McKenzie's third habeas petition.205 
The Gomez Court held that when a petitioner "resorts to last-
minute attempts to manipulate the judicial process," a court 
may refuse to grant equitable relief. 206 
The Ninth Circuit noted that the Supreme Court's sugges-
tion that a court may consider the last-minute nature of a stay 
was not elaborated in the Court's brief opinion, nor was it 
developed in subsequent cases.207 Further, the punitive 
Gomez rule, refusal to consider an otherwise valid claim, has 
never been applied except in cases where the petitioner failed 
to show "even a semblance of a reasonable excuse for the inor-
dinate delay.,,208 Therefore, the holding in Gomez should not 
202. Gomez v. United States Dist. Ct. for the N. Dist. of Cal., 503 U.S. 653 
(1992). 
203. See McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1461, 1464 (9th Cir. 1995) and supra notes 
113-46 and accompanying text. 
204. See McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1463-70 and supra notes 42-62, 82-86 and accom-
panying text. 
205. McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1464. 
206. Gomez v. United States Dist. Ct. for the N. Dist. of Cal., 503 U.S. 653, 
654 (1992). 
207. McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1476. 
208. [d. at 1477 (quoting Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 426 (1995)). The 
Eleventh Circuit based a decision on this principle. However, there the petitioner 
offered no good reason for his six-year refusal to pursue and exhaust his state 
remedies and file a federal petition. Further, the court noted that the petitioner 
offered no excuse for his manipulative practice of waiting until the day of his 
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have been expanded to apply to McKenzie's petition because of 
the fundamental differences between the cases.209 
The first such difference is that McKenzie's application 
was not a last minute attempt.210 The Gomez Court held that 
filing a petition a mere three days before a scheduled execution 
constituted a last minute attempt.211 McKenzie, however, 
filed his application over six weeks prior to his scheduled exe-
cution.212 
Second, in Gomez, the Supreme Court denied the petition 
for a stay of execution by holding that it was an attempt to 
manipulate the judicial process.213 The Court explained that 
the petitioner in Gomez obviously attempted to avoid applica-
tion of the abuse of the writ of habeas corpus jurisprudence by 
seeking a stay of execution through a § 1983 suit, rather than 
through a habeas petition.214 
McKenzie did not attempt to manipulate the judicial sys-
tem by filing his petition.215 He raised his Eighth Amend-
ment claim as soon as he had a plausible basis for bringing the 
claim.216 The majority argued that, even in the absence of 
positive authority for the claim, McKenzie should have raised 
it because it had been raised in other cases.217 However, the 
Supreme Court has stated that petitioners aren't required to 
209. See McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1476-78. 
210. Id. at 1477. 
211. See generally Gomez, 503 U.S. at 653. 
212. McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1477. 
213. Gomez, 503 U.S. at 653-54. 
214. McKenzie, 57 F.3d .at 1477. Three days before the petitioner in Gomez was 
scheduled to be executed, a class action was filed under § 1983 claiming that 
California's method of execution was unconstitutional and requested a temporary 
restraining order to prevent further executions. Id. 
215. See id. at 1474-79. 
216. Id. at 1481. McKenzie's counsel argued that he raised the Eighth Amend-
ment claim as soon as he learned that the Supreme Court issued a stay for Clar-
ence Lackey. Counsel asserted that this suggested that several justices thought the 
issue was one on which certiorari might be appropriate. Counsel cited to Barefoot 
v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 895 (1983), which held that "a stay issues only if there is 
reasonable probability that four members of the Court would consider the underly-
ing issue sufficiently meritorious for the grant of certiorari - - [and] a significant 
possibility of reversal of the lower court's decision." See Brief for Appellant at 29. 
217. McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1465. 
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bring all remotely plausible constitutional claims that could, 
some day, gain recognition.218 Finally, McKenzie used the 
proper habeas procedures to raise his claim; he did not file a § 
1983 suit.219 
Considering these factors, the majority misapplied the 
holding in Gomez to deny McKenzie his appeal of the district 
court's dismissal of his petition.220 
B. THE MAJORITY'S FAILURE TO APPLY THE PROPER EIGHTH 
AMENDMENT ANALYSIS 
The majority deemed it prudent to give McKenzie's Eighth 
Amendment claim preliminary consideration because a show-
ing of success may outweigh any delay in raising the claim.221 
Regarding Eighth Amendment violations, the Supreme Court 
has stated that the clause "is not fastened to the obsolete but 
may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by 
a humane justice."222 The Supreme Court further stated that 
the Amendment "must draw its meaning from the evolving 
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing 
society. ,,223 
The majority clearly ignored the precedent set forth by the 
Supreme Court and did not discuss public opinion or evolving 
standards of decency.224 The majority did acknowledge that 
foreign courts have held it to be cruel and unusual punishment 
to execute a prisoner after an inordinate delay.225 Neverthe-
less, instead of interpreting these cases as an indication that 
evolving standards of decency may have changed, or that pub-
218. [d. at 1481 (quoting Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 16 (1984». 
219. McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1479. 
220. See id. at 1477. 
221. McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1461, 1466 (9th Cir 1995). 
222. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910). 
223. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). 
224. See McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1461-70. See also supra notes 44-62 and accom-
panying text. 
225. [d. at 1466. The majority refers to Pratt & Morgan v. Attorney General for 
Jamaica, 3 SLR 995, 2 AC 1, 4 All ER 769 (Privy Council 1993), and Catholic 
Comm'n for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe v. Attorney General, No. S.C. 73 
(Zimb. June 24, 1993). [d. 
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lic opinion has become enlightened by a humane justice, the 
majority did not believe that view would prevail in the United 
States.226 However, the Court has traditionally examined 
views of challenged punishment as expressed by objective evi-
dence of community values, including international practic-
es.227 Thus, the majority did not engage in any meaningful 
Eighth Amendment legal analysis.228 
The majority also blatantly ignored Justice Stevens' memo-
randum that directly addressed this Eighth Amendment 
claim.229 In his memorandum, Stevens stated that capital 
punishment is justified because it "might serve two principal 
social purposes: retribution and deterrence. It is arguable that 
neither retains any force for prisoners who have spent some 17 
years under a sentence of death.,,230 By failing to address this 
assertion, the majority chose to ignore the guidance of the 
Supreme COurt.231 McKenzie argued that his twenty-one 
years on death row under harsh conditions satisfied the retri-
bution interest.232 In addition, McKenzie argued that since 
twenty years had passed since his sentencing, and that no one 
in Montana had been executed since 1943, the deterrent value 
of executing him was nullified.233 McKenzie's execution argu-
ably would not further state interests; the majority should 
have at least addressed this argument.234 
In addition to struggling with his pending execution for 21 
years, McKenzie alleged that he waited under the most diffi-
cult prison conditions.235 McKenzie has a pending federal civil 
rights lawsuit alleging his long term denial of medical care. 236 
226. [d. 
227. See, e.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830-31 & nn. 31, 34 (1988) 
(referring to international opinion and practices expressed in statutes and treaties 
of Western European and Anglo-American nations in holding that the death penal-
ty for juveniles constitutes cruel and unusual punishment). 
228. See McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1466-68. 
229. [d. See Lackey v. Texas, 115 S. Ct. 1421 (1995). 
230. Lackey, 115 S. Ct. at 1421. Stevens also noted that the Eighth Amendment 
does not prohibit capital punishment partly because the death penalty was consid-
ered permissible by the Framers. [d. 
231. See McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1466-68. 
232. [d. at 1486. 
233. [d. at 1486-87. 
234. [d. 
235. See Brief for Appellant at 33. 
236. [d. at n.14. McKenzie is the named plaintiff in McKenzie v. Chisolm, (D. 
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Further, McKenzie and other maximum security inmates have 
a pending action regarding beatings and deprivation of proper-
ty following a prison riot, caused by systemic mismanagement 
and neglect.237 These conditions alone may have violated 
McKenzie's Eighth Amendment rights. 238 
The majority should have conducted a more comprehensive 
analysis for it is undisputable that McKenzie's Eighth Amend-
ment claim is important and deserves a careful and thoughtful 
adjudication.239 The majority should not have applied the lim-
ited meaning of Gomez to McKenzie's third petition for habeas 
cOrpUS.240 Rather, the majority should have followed the prop-
er procedures and remanded the case to the district court, 
where the state could have raised an abuse of writ doctrine for 
McKenzie's failure to raise the claim in a previous petition.241 
Further, by remanding the case and issuing a stay pending the 
district court's consideration of McKenzie's Eighth Amendment 
claim, the majority would have followed Justice Stevens's 
statement that the importance and novelty of this issue is 
sufficient to warrant review by the Supreme Court after it has 
been considered by other courtS.242 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In McKenzie v. Day,243 the Ninth Circuit first erred by 
not properly addressing McKenzie's appea1,244 The majority 
then greatly expanded the holding of Gomez v. United States 
District Court for the Northern District of California245 to dis-
miss McKenzie's petition as a last minute attempt to manipu-
Mont.) 92-67-H-CCL. Id. 
237. Id. McKenzie is a plaintiff in In re September 22, 1991 Riot, D. Mont. No. 
93-19-H-LBE. Id. 
238. See Brief for Appellant at 33. 
239. McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1488. 
240. Id. at 1478. 
241. Id. at 1474. 
242. Lackey, 115 S. Ct. at 1421. 
243. 57 F.3d 1461 (9th Cir. 1995). 
244. See McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1470-71. The district court erred in voluntarily 
dismissing McKenzie's petition by holding that it was "successive and repetitive." 
Id. 
245. Gomez v. United States Dist. Ct. for the Dist. of Cal., 503 U.S. 653 (1992). 
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late the judicial process.246 Finally, the majority concluded 
that McKenzie's claim that a 20-year delay in carrying out his 
death sentence amounted to cruel and unusual punishment 
was not likely to succeed if litigated to its conclusion.247 In 
reaching this conclusion, the court failed to engage in any 
meaningful Eighth Amendment analysis and ignored Justice 
Stevens' memorandum that this issue needs to be further ad-
dressed by lower courts. 248 
Although the State executed Mr. McKenzie, other death 
row inmates live to pursue virtually indistinguishable Eighth 
Amendment claims.249 
Amber A. Belt 
246. See McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1479. 
247. [d. at 1467. 
248. See id. at 1466-68. 
249. [d. at 1489. McKenzie was executed by the State of Montana on May 10, 
1995. McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1495 (9th Cir. 1995). 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1997. 
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